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The Director of Central Intelligence Washington, D.C 20505

Critical Intelligence Problems Committee

DCI/ICS-82-4255 6 August 1982

MEMORANDUM FOR:	Deputy Director of Central Intelligence		
VIA:	Director, Intelligence Community Staff	25X1	
FROM:	Chairman 2	25X1	
SUBJECT:	A Brief Survey of Intelligence Community Efforts Concerning Biological/Chemical Warfare 2	25 X 1	
1. Dr. Manfred Eimer, ACDA, recently asked			
2. Briefly, interviews at CIA, DIA, and NSA identified BW/CW efforts across the Intelligence Community including specific tasks at WSSIC, STIC, and STAP and a Priority Collection Project (PCP-IV). The attached informal report lists the people and organizations contacted and contains a brief status report on each major activity.			
3. We did not review the coordination of the overall effort nor did we address the extent to which these ongoing efforts would support BW/CW treaty negotiation, monitoring and verification. The DCI's appointment of Dr. (CIA/OSWR) as the Intelligence Community focal point for 5X1			
Working Group on coordination. W Biological Weapon	cal Warfare/Toxin Use and the formation of a new Interagency CBW/Toxin Use Intelligence is designed to improve ith regard to treaty verification, NSDD-18 (<u>US Chemical and ns Arms Control Policy</u>) called for the preparation of studies rtmental Group (IG) on CBW Arms Control and, where required,	25X1	

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submission of recommendations on a number of issues related to the implementation of US policy in both the biological weapons (BW) and chemical weapons (CW) arms control area. Those studies were recently completed and the results and recommendations forwarded to the State Department. The Interdepartmental Group also has under way a detailed study on verification of a complete chemical weapons prohibition. It will include sections on verification requirements, monitoring capabilities, specific measures for meeting the requirements, and recommendations for a US position on verification of a multilateral convention prohibiting chemical weapons. The Intelligence Community (with coordination by the Arms Control Staff) is responsible for drafting the section on monitoring capabilities and limitations, with DoD and ACDA largely responsible for drafting other sections.	5 X
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Attachments: a/s

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